sity entrance exam scores were posted at the school gates, and every year an even more select few would be o ered direct admission to key universities. A less obvious marker of elite status was the science students' Communist Youth League pins; though their politics classes were sometimes omitted in favor of extra math, almost every science student sported a Youth League pin.
During the tender age of their early teens, my students were being funneled through the two systems of credentialing that form the backdrop of Joel Andreas's Rise of the Red Engineers: e Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China's New Class. Andreas refers to these two systems as the "academic credentialing system" and the "political credentialing system. " In the former, students in China pass through increasingly selective keypoint schools for which the state devotes signicant resources. In the latter, parallel system, increasingly selective organizationsYoung Pioneers, Communist Youth League, and Communist Party-choose their members. In today's China, Andreas explains, it is the engineers who occupy the highest positions in Party leadership and state bureaucracy, and they have come to their positions through their academic and political credentials. Eight out of nine members of the Standing Committing of the Political Bureau are such "Red Engineers, " and it is this class that rules China today (p. In part , which focuses on the early years of the Cultural Revolution, Andreas compares the experiences of Tsinghua's a liated middle school and Tsinghua University to show how political and cultural capital became an axis of contention.
However, the outcome was not necessarily proscribed. In the case of the middle school, students factionalized along the lines of political and cultural capital. e Red Guards (children of Communist cadres) attacked educational elites, and the Jinggangshan group (children of intellectuals) attacked political privilege. At the university, however, the Red Guards (children of cadres) defended the work team sent to moderate revolution against another Jinggangshan group who attacked the authority of the work team, ultimately giving way to a moderate group called April Fourteenth. Here, class did not necessarily dictate faction, as each faction had members from all groups (a situation in uenced by a student body with percent workers and peasants), and because Mao's attack on political and cultural capital brought students from di erent classes together. Andreas's analysis of these two institutions changes the way we think and teach about the Cultural Revolution; the middle school pattern, he shows, is not necessarily representative, and coalitions are as important as fractures.
In the third section, "Institutionalizing the Cultural Revolution, " Andreas evaluates the radical policies of the period up until Mao's death in . e introduction of a Workers' Propaganda Team to supervise the university replicated the Red-over-expert power structure from the s, with a twist: rebellion was institutionalized, but the propaganda team brooked no opposition, so that "in practice they remained inextricably bound up with the political culture they were criticizing" (p. ). Under this new regime, policies to eliminate the distinction between mental and manual labor-having students labor, opening factories on campus, creating a system of agricultural schools-revisited the class-leveling campaigns of the Great Leap Forward (chapter ). Perhaps the most signi cant of these policies was the system of "mass recommendation, " which replaced college entrance exams with a system to recruit worker and peasant children for university placement. Although this system resulted in a signi cant change to the demographics of the student population (p.
), the system was still vulnerable to political clientalism and the persistence of backdoor admissions for children of revolutionary cadres; Xi Jinping was one of those students recommended to Tsinghua in this period, showing that even in an era that denied any form of class privilege, political capital could still be transferred into cultural capital.
Rise of the Red Engineers concludes in the post-Mao era, with the arrival of a new leadership team, the denunciation of radicals, and Deng Xiaoping's appointment of Jiang Nanxiang as the leader of the Cultural Revolution investigations. e political and academic systems of credentialing were rebuilt in ways that suggest that they are more systematized-and more elite-than before. With Deng Xiaoping's call for all Reds to be experts, Andreas argues, room for the laboring classes in positions of power has decreased dramatically (p. ), and, instead, a new Red and expert class has come to power, "although the former had been drained of its original ideological meaning" (p. Some readers may nd it surprising that Andreas does not dwell on political violence in this book, although I would argue that it is really outside the scope of his analysis. More relevant, perhaps, may be a treatment of students who were not political; was there room for this sort of student in either Tsinghua's middle school or the university, and if so, what was their experience and how was it understood?
It may also be worth a further gender analysis; in examining the student population a er the system of mass recommendation, Andreas notes that the gender imbalance remained much unchanged (except among the rural students) (p. 
